POLICY MEMORANDUM SAMPLES
I. Introduction

The following policy memorandum samples provide you with examples on the format of a policy memorandum. They display a variety and approaches and styles that you may find helpful when developing your own policy memorandum.

Please note that these examples do not necessarily correspond to the writing guidelines and evaluation criteria specifically established for the Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge (e.g. some memos do not provide sources). The samples are therefore by no means a template for your memo.

Please carefully follow the memo writing instructions provided separately to ensure that your submission meets the requirements established for the Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge.

II. List of sample policy memos


MEMORANDUM

TO: President of the United States
FROM: [   ]
SUBJECT: Re-organizing the Government to Combat the WMD Threat
DATE: xx / xx / xxxx

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is the most serious threat to U.S. security today, and will remain so far into the future. Whereas combating proliferation is an inherently government-wide mission, the existing national security architecture has resulted in a series of agency-specific efforts that are often poorly coordinated and fail to take advantage of important synergies. Re-organizing the government to meet the WMD threat therefore requires reforms that strengthen White House management of nonproliferation programs, expand interagency counterproliferation capabilities, and improve WMD-related intelligence.

Strengthen White House Management of Nonproliferation Programs
The Departments of Energy (DOE), State, Defense (DOD), Commerce, and Homeland Security (DHS) all contribute to U.S. nonproliferation efforts, but receive insufficient top-level program guidance and coordination. For example, DOE did not learn of Libya’s decision to abandon its nuclear program until it was revealed in the press. Moreover, DOE had no plan in place to dismantle Libya’s nuclear assets despite its central role in performing such activities. Finally, proliferation detection R&D projects are currently managed by a community of end users that have overlapping needs but rarely communicate with each other.

To prevent future interagency breakdowns, the White House should designate a new senior-level Nonproliferation Policy and Program Director (NPD) to oversee all U.S. government nonproliferation programs. The NPD will chair a new National Security Council Policy Coordinating Committee on Nonproliferation (PCC) that will set overarching nonproliferation goals and priorities, develop an interagency strategic plan to achieve those goals and priorities, identify and assign missions and responsibilities to appropriate agencies, and coordinate program execution. To improve proliferation detection R&D, the NPD and PCC will also design an interagency technology development plan that will integrate and prioritize the needs of various technology end users across the government with the capabilities of the U.S. national laboratory system, private industry, and top universities. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will work with the new NPD and PCC to develop a multi-year interagency nonproliferation program budget, and will apply performance measures to monitor program management and implementation.

Although the NPD and the PCC will require little additional funding, past attempts at White House policy coordination – such as the Office of Homeland Security – have sunk into irrelevance because of agency resistance. To avoid suffering a similar fate, the NPD and PCC must possess clearly delineated authority and high level backing. In particular, the NPD should enjoy unambiguous control over nonproliferation policy and program budgets. The PCC should require agency participation at the Under Secretary level. Most important, the NPD and PCC must receive consistent, visible support from the President.
**Expand Interagency Counterproliferation Capabilities**

The U.S. military and homeland security communities must be able to rapidly respond to proliferation emergencies. To provide this capability, the United States should create and train “Proliferation Risk Mitigation Teams” – akin to the Department of Homeland Security’s Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) – comprised of DOD special operations forces (SOF), CIA operatives, and DOE technical specialists. These teams will be capable of securing nuclear storage facilities and other sensitive infrastructure during combat operations or in response to the collapse of central authority in states that possess nuclear assets that are attractive to terrorists. They will also provide logistical and operational support to the Energy Department’s “Global Cleanout” program that seeks to return stockpiles of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium to Russia and the United States. Finally, they will engage in extensive “red-teaming” simulations in order to foster better situation awareness and preparedness.

Operational control of Proliferation Risk Mitigation Teams will pose a major challenge. Congress may object to placing the teams under CIA control in light of the agency’s past abuses. Moreover, DOD will be reluctant to assign SOF personnel to the teams if they will be placed under the command authority of a different agency. Given the types of operations in which the teams are likely to engage, DOD operational control would therefore seem most appropriate. The teams will cost approximately $500 million annually to train and equip. To provide the necessary funding, the United States should cancel the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser program, which has been plagued by cost overruns and schedule delays.

**Improve WMD Intelligence**

The effectiveness of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts ultimately depends on the quality of WMD intelligence. Unfortunately, the U.S. intelligence community has a poor track record of detecting both state-level and sub-state WMD proliferation. It failed to anticipate India’s nuclear test in 1998, produced flawed assessments of the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and only belatedly uncovered the nuclear black market smuggling ring of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. In addition, the intelligence community remains unable to provide reliable information on the status of nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.

To improve community-wide WMD intelligence collection and analysis, the United States should, per the recommendation of the recent WMD commission, create a new National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). The Center would report directly to the new Director for National Intelligence and set requirements for WMD-related human, imagery, and signals collection for the entire intelligence community. It would also house an analytical division that would provide high-quality, actionable intelligence assessments to customers across the U.S. government, including the new White House NPD.

The NCPC will require approximately $1 billion in annual funding. Given this price tag, Congress may resist creation of the NCPC until it can determine whether recent legislation will effectively address current intelligence community deficiencies. Moreover, CIA already operates an analytical unit devoted to WMD intelligence (WINPAC) that will fiercely resist encroachment upon its turf. The NCPC should therefore function as both a consumer and independent reviewer of WINPAC intelligence products while avoiding disruptive turf battles. Competition between WINPAC and the NCPC could result in higher-quality intelligence products from both.